I. INT�onucT�oN
The exponential increase in the number of Bilateral Investment Treaties (BITS)' signed by state parties has contributed to a rise in the number of investment treaty arbitrations initiated by private investors.2 These treaties, which usually allow foreign private investors to initiate arbitration proceedings against state signatories,3 have provided an avenue for foreign investors to directly resolve their investment disputes with host states through private arbitration.4 They are able to do so without having to seek the protection of their countries of origin. The awards issued in these arbitration proceedings6 are gradually bringing some clarity to the scope, implications, and limitations of some of the provisions commonly found in BITS.7
This article analyzes how most-favored-nation clauses (MFN clauses) contained in BITs have been interpreted in recent investment treaty arbitrations.8 These clauses, which typically require state parties to a BIT to grant investors from signatory states the most favorable treatment they grant to investors from any other country.,9 are one of the core provisions of Brrs. As a principle of nondiscrimination 111 aimed at promoting the equality of treatment of foreign invcstors, the MFN treatment plays an important role in liberalizing international investment regimes. 12
It is perhaps because of the centrality of MFN clauses in BITS that their interpretation by investment arbitration tribunals has attracted considerable attention. 13 Recent investment treaty awards have focused on the applicability of MFN clauses to both substantive and procedural aspects ofinvestment protection,.14 Although the tribunals in these proceedings often use the Vienna Convention on the Law ofTreaties (the Vicnna Convention)�5 as the fulcrum for their analysis of how to interpret these clauses,16 their divergent reasoning and approaches to the problem have led some commentators to lament the lack of a central authority to bring sole unifornxity to investment treaty arbitral jurisprudence.17
The Maffl,7iiii"' and the Plama19 awards and their progeny have been suggested as presenting conflicting perspectives on the scope and reach of MFN clause in BITs. 20 While the approaches adopted in these awards may not be as radically conflicting as some commentators have suggested,21 these approaches have engendered considerable
